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THE BONDS OF JOINT TAX LIABILITY SHOULD NOT
BE STRONGER THAN MARRIAGE: CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT BEHIND § 6015(c) SEPARATION OF LIABILITY
RELIEF
Svetlana G. Attestatova
Abstract: Spouses who file joint tax returns are jointly and severally liable for any
resulting tax deficiency. In the past, only innocent spouses-those with no knowledge of the
tax understatement-could qualify for relief from such liability. In 1998, Congress expanded
existing innocent spouse relief and added two new forms of relief-the separation of liability
and discretionary relief provisions. Codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c), separation of liability
relief allocates items that give rise to a deficiency to each spouse as if they had filed separate
returns, and is only available to spouses who are divorced, separated, or living apart.
However, a claimant spouse cannot obtain separation of liability relief if the Secretary of the
Treasury can prove the claimant had actual knowledge of "any item giving rise to a
deficiency." Courts and the Department of the Treasury have interpreted this exception to
refer to the transaction underlying a deficiency. In contrast, taxpayers and members of the
Tax Section of the American Bar Association argue that this statutory language means an
item on a joint return. This Comment examines the text, structure, and legislative history of
§ 6015(c), and concludes that there is strong support for the latter reading. Therefore, this
Comment urges Congress and the Treasury to amend § 6015(c) and its implementing
regulations to clarify Congress' intended meaning.
Filing a joint tax return generally subjects spouses to joint and several
liability.t Until 1971, this rule was absolute and resulted in cases of
"grave injustice.",2 The typical case of inequity arose when one spouse
failed to report embezzled funds on a joint return, secretly squandered
them, and then deserted the other spouse.3 Often the other spouse had
derived no benefit from the funds and had no knowledge of the
embezzler's activities or the resulting omission on the tax return, but was
nevertheless held jointly and severally liable for the resulting tax
1. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2000); see also Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem:
Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 319 n.2
(1990) ("This rule has been in the statute since 1938, but before that date it was controversial and
the subject of litigation."). Joint and several liability is "[l]iability that may be apportioned either
among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group, at the adversary's
discretion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999).
2. See S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970) (citing Louise M. Scudder, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967)
(recognizing the inflexibility and harshness of the statute when a wife was held liable for tax
liability created by her husband's failure to report embezzled funds)).
3. See id.
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deficiency. In 1971, Congress recognized the injustice of holding such a
spouse liable, and lessened the harshness of the joint and several liability
rule. Congress enacted a relief provision6 that became known as
innocent spouse relief,7 which alleviated liability for spouses who had no
knowledge of and did not significantly benefit from the omitted income.8
This provision, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e), was intended "to bring
government tax collection practices into accord with basic principles of
equity and fairness." 9 Since the enactment of § 6013(e) in 1971, the
scope of joint and several liability relief has been expanded twice-first
in 1984,10 and again in 1998."
While inequity is apparent in the case of the embezzler spouse, it is
not as clear in a case where one spouse receives retirement distributions,
erroneously claims them as non-taxable on a joint return, and uses the
funds to pay off the mortgage on the family home. 12 If the spouses later
divorce, the second spouse, who did not receive the retirement funds but
knew about their receipt by the first spouse, may be awarded the family
home pursuant to a divorce decree.' 3 Should that second spouse, who
significantly benefited from the retirement funds, nonetheless be
relieved from joint and several liability for the deficiency caused by the
funds' omission from the joint return? Under § 6013(e), the second
spouse remained liable because he or she knew or had reason to know of
4. Id.
5. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 2 (1970).
6. See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 6013(e) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
7. Although former § 6013(e) did not actually use that term, the courts did. See Ewing v.
Comm'r, 118 T.C. 494, 518 n.3 (2002) (Laro, J., dissenting) (noting that the term innocent spouse
was apparently spawned in Spanos v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 861, 864 (D. Md. 1963), where
the court described a taxpayer who had filed a joint return with her husband as an innocent spouse
after noting that the taxpayer had no income of her own and was innocent of her husband's
fraudulent failure to file a federal income tax return when it was due).
8. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
9. S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 2.
10. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801-03 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
11. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(a), (e)(l), 112 Stat. 734, 734-39 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
12. Hypothetical based on Cheshire v. Commissioner. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
13. See id. at 330.
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the tax understatement, which has been interpreted by courts to mean
knowledge of the underlying transaction. 14
Congress enacted extensive changes to § 6013(e) in 1998, replacing it
with § 6015.15 Section 6015 provides three different forms of relief:
innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b), separation of liability relief
under § 6015(c), and discretionary relief under § 6015(f). 16 Separation
of liability relief is only available to spouses who are divorced,
separated, or living apart.' 7 However, that form of relief is not available
if a claimant spouse has actual knowledge of the "item giving rise to a
deficiency" on a joint tax return.18 The language item giving rise to a
deficiency can have two meanings: (1) the spouse knows about the
underlying transaction that gave rise to the omitted income (or the
erroneously claimed deduction or credit, as the case may be), or (2) the
spouse knows that the item on the return was incorrect when it was
signed.' 9 Under the underlying transaction interpretation, separation of
liability relief would not be available to the second spouse in the
example above because that spouse had actual knowledge of the
retirement funds.20 However, under the item on a return interpretation,
the second spouse could obtain separation of liability relief despite
knowing about the retirement funds, as long as the spouse did not know
that the funds' tax treatment on a return was incorrect.
2
'
14. Cf id. at 332-35 (applying requirements similar to the pre-1998 provision to a post-1998-
amendment case).
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000).
17. Id. § 6015(c)(3)(A).
18. Id. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
19. See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 203 (2000) (Colvin, J., dissenting).
20. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d
326, 335 (5th Cir. 2002). This Comment will use the term underlying transaction to encompass a
variety of phrases used by courts. See Mitchell, 292 F.3d at 806 (holding that the Service does not
have to show "actual knowledge of the improper tax treatment of an item"); Cheshire, 282 F.3d at
337 (using the phrase "an item of income, deduction or credit"); Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 195 (using
the phrase "an actual and clear awareness of the omitted income" in cases of omitted income). But
cf Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 200 (Thomton, J., concurring) (concluding that the majority's standard
requiring knowledge of omitted income "inherently rejects" the Internal Revenue Service's
argument that "actual knowledge of an 'item' means actual knowledge merely of the event or
transaction giving rise to the deficiency").
21. See Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 203-07 (Colvin, J., dissenting). This Comment will use the term
item on a return to cover a variety of phrases used to describe knowledge of incorrect tax reporting.
See, e.g., Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 335-36 (rejecting taxpayer's argument that knowledge refers to
"incorrect tax reporting of an item of income, deduction or credit" and refusing to construe the
statute to bar relief only for spouses who know that "an entry on the joint tax return is incorrect");
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This Comment argues that Congress intended separation of liability
relief to apply to spouses who did not have actual knowledge that a
particular item on a joint return was incorrectly claimed, even if they did
have knowledge of the underlying transaction giving rise to that item.
Part I describes the legislative history of § 6015, and its three types of
relief, focusing on the operation of the separation of liability relief
provision. Part II examines how the actual knowledge exception to
separation of liability relief has been interpreted. Part III looks at the
case law interpreting the knowledge requirement of innocent spouse
relief under § 6015(b) and former § 6013(e). Finally, Part IV analyzes
the text, structure, and legislative history of the actual knowledge
exception, and argues that spouses who do not have actual knowledge of
an incorrect item on a joint return, but who know about the underlying
transaction, should still be allowed to separate their tax liability. This
Comment further suggests that the overbroad judicial interpretation of
the actual knowledge exception should be remedied by a legislative or
administrative amendment.
I. SECTION 6015 PROVIDES SPOUSES WITH THREE
AVENUES OF RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
When Congress broadened joint and several liability relief in 1998, it
was responding to the inadequacy of taxpayer protection under the pre-
1998 innocent spouse provision.22 With that remedial purpose in mind,
Congress added two new forms of relief and expanded the existing
innocent spouse relief.23 One of the new forms of relief is the separation
of liability provision, which is premised on the principle of individual
responsibility and is granted only to spouses who are divorced,
separated, or living apart.24 The second new form of relief is the
discretionary relief provision, which permits the Secretary of the
Treasury (the Secretary) to extend relief in cases where a taxpayer
Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 206-07 (Colvin, J., dissenting) (concluding that the knowledge requirement
means "knowledge that the return is incorrect, not knowledge that there was an income-producing
activity or transaction").
22. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 249-52 (1998).
23. See id.
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c) (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 53-62, 79-101.
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cannot qualify for either innocent spouse or separation of liability relief,
but still merits protection.25
A. Congress Enacted § 6015 to Remedy the Inadequate Protection of
Spouses Under Former § 6013(e)
Congress first expanded the original innocent spouse relief provision
in 1984.26 This amendment to § 6013(e) extended relief not only to cases
of income omitted from a return, 27 but also to cases involving an
erroneously claimed deduction, credit, or basis.28 To obtain relief under
the 1984 amendment, the claimant spouse had to prove five elements:
(1) a joint return had been filed; (2) the tax understatement was
"substantial" (over $500 and a specified percentage of a spouse's
income); (3) this understatement was attributable to "grossly erroneous"
items (either omitted from gross income or having no basis in fact or law
in case of a deduction, credit, or basis); (4) the claimant had no actual or
constructive knowledge of such understatement; and (5) it would be
inequitable to hold the claimant liable for the tax deficiency.
29
Despite this expansion, § 6013(e) proved inadequate because its many
stringent requirements were extremely difficult for a claimant spouse to
prove.3° Out of the five statutory relief requirements under former
§ 6013(e),3' the only requirement that was easily satisfied was showing
that a joint return had been filed. The substantial understatement
requirement 32 caused hardships to some taxpayers if their liability was
$500 or less.33 In addition, courts differed widely in their interpretations
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f); see also infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
26. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801-03 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
27. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A) (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(2) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
29. See id. § 6013(e)(1)-(4).
30. Senator Graham remarked that pre-1998 innocent spouse relief was merely "theoretical"
because it was "virtually impossible for the standards of that innocent spouse provision to be met."
144 CONG. REC. S4473-74 (daily ed. May 7, 1998). See also Jessica L. Angney, Note, It's New but
Is It Improved?: The New "Innocent Spouse" Provision, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 605-10 (1999).
31. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)-(4) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
32. Id. § 6013(e)(l)(B), (e)(3); see also supra text accompanying note 29.
33. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JOINT LIABILITY AND INNOCENT
SPOUSE ISSUES 49-50 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 TREASURY REPORT], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/innospos.pdf.
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of what deductions met the standard of "having no basis in fact or law"' 34
under the "grossly erroneous" requirement. 35 The requirement that a
claimant spouse must have no actual or constructive knowledge of the
tax understatement 36-the "innocence" requirement37-resulted in a
large body of conflicting case law with unpredictable outcomes.38
Commentators harshly criticized this innocence requirement for having
"degenerated into a subjective [inquiry] best characterized as whether
the spouse seeking relief can move the judge to sympathy." 39 Similarly,
the requirement that holding a claimant spouse liable for a tax deficiency
must be inequitable 40-- the "equity" requirement 4 '-was criticized for
being "vague and unpredictable.,
42
Proposals to modify § 6013(e) ranged from urging the complete
repeal of joint and several liability to abolishing the filing of joint
returns.43 In 1998, Congress replaced § 6013(e) with § 6015 as part of
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. 44
Congress was concerned with the inadequacy of the innocent spouse
provisions 45 and enacted § 6015 to make relief from joint and several
liability more accessible.46 Like former § 6013(e),47 § 6015 had a broad
remedial purpose.48
34. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF 'INNOCENT SPOUSES,' JCX-6-98, at 6 nn.29-31 (J. Comm. Print
1998) [hereinafter 1998 BACKGROUND REPORT], available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-6-98.htm.
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B), (e)(2) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)); see
also supra text accompanying note 29.
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C); see also supra text accompanying note 29.
37. Beck, supra note 1, at 326, 351-52; American Bar Association Resolutions and Report
adopted by its House of Delegates in Feb. 1995, filed as Addendum to Brief of Amici Curiae in
Favor of Reversal, at 5, Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-60855)
[hereinafter ABA Proposal].
38. Exploring the Development of Taxpayer Bill of Rights II Legislation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 104-05 (1995)
(statement of Richard C.E. Beck, professor of law) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Beck].
39. ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 5; see Statement of Professor Beck, supra note 38, at 106.
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)); see also
supra text accompanying note 29.
41. Statement of Professor Beck, supra note 38, at 104; ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 5.
42. ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 5.
43. See Angney, supra note 30, at 610-11; see also 1998 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 33, at
23-44 (reviewing various proposals).
44. Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 734 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
45. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 249-52 (1998).
46. Id. at 249.
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Section 6015 was the result of a compromise between different House
and Senate versions of the bill.49 The innocent spouse provision of the
House bill preserved the basic framework of former § 6013(e) but
lessened the requirements a spouse must meet to qualify for relief.50 In
particular, the House bill provided that the tax understatement no longer
had to be substantial and required the understatement to be attributable
to only erroneous-rather than grossly erroneous-items. 1
In contrast, the Senate amendment liberalized the House bill.52 The
Senate version rejected the constraints of the § 6013(e) framework and
approached the relief provision on a different theoretical level, endorsing
a separation of liability method 53 based on a proposal by the American
54Bar Association. The separation of liability approach allowed a
claimant spouse to sever his or her tax liability from that of the other
spouse by allocating income, deductions, or credits as if they had filed
separate returns.55 Thus, liability for a tax deficiency caused by omitted
income, an erroneous credit, or an erroneous deduction would follow
only the person responsible for that error.56 When Senator Graham
presented the Senate amendment,57 he explained that the Senate
47. See Price v. Comm'r, 887 F.2d 959, 963 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that giving § 6013(e) an
unduly narrow and restrictive reading would hinder Congress' broader purpose in seeking to remedy
an injustice).
48. See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 201 (2000) (Parr, J., dissenting).
49. See Angney, supra note 30, at 614-15.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 19, 60-61 (1997).
51. See id. at 61.
52. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55-56 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. S4160-61 (daily ed. May 4,
1998).
53. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 56. This concept has been also referred to as (1) the "item"
approach, ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 7; IRS Restructuring (Innocent Spouse Tax Rules):
Hearing on H.R. 2676 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1998)
[hereinafter IRS Restructuring Hearing] (statement of Marjorie O'Connell, tax attorney, O'Connell
& Associates); (2) the "division of liability" method, Brief of Amici Curiae in Favor of Reversal at
2, Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-60855) [hereinafter Cheshire Amici
Brief], available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/groups/domrel/cheshirebrief.pdf (last visited June 22,
2003); and (3) the "accounting" approach, 144 CONG. REc. S4474 (daily ed. May 7, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Graham). This Comment uses the phrase separation of liability approach.
54. See ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 6-7.
55. See S. REP.No. 105-174, at 56.
56. See id. at 55-56.
57. Senators Graham, D'Amato, and Feinstein introduced an amendment to the actual knowledge
exception, which became part of the final bill, to make actual knowledge relevant at the time an
individual signed the return, and to remove cases of duress from the exception's coverage. See 144
CONG. REC. S4473-74 (daily ed. May 7, 1998).
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Committee on Finance had adopted the American Bar Association
separation of liability approach to replace joint and several responsibility
with "individual responsibility."58
A Conference Committee was appointed to resolve the disagreement
between the House and Senate versions of the bill; the Committee
successfully reached a compromise 59 that was approved by both
houses.60 The resulting 1998 amendment repealed § 6013(e) and
replaced it with § 6015, which combined the House and Senate
versions.6 1 The Senate's liberal separation of liability relief was
included, although it was limited to taxpayers who were divorced,
separated, or had been living apart for at least one year. 62 Further, the
1998 amendment included the House provision that modified the
innocent spouse relief and was available to taxpayers who did not
qualify for separation of liability relief.63 The Conference Committee
added the third form of relief to cover "appropriate situations to avoid
the inequitable treatment of spouses" in the Secretary's discretion.64 The
price of this compromise was the mixture of three forms of relief, each
operating under different policies: prerequisite innocence and equity
embedded in innocent spouse relief;65 individual responsibility for a
spouse's own taxes underlying separation of liability relief;66 and
inequity avoidance under discretionary relief.
67
B. Section 6015 Transformed the Innocent Spouse Relief Under
Former § 6013(e) into Three Forms of Relief
As a result of the Conference Committee's compromise, § 6015
provides for three distinct types of relief that are codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 6015(b), (c), and (f). The first avenue of relief, § 6015(b), is a
reformed version of the former innocent spouse provision, § 6013(e),
58. See id. at S4474.
59. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 249-55 (1998).
60. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201, 112 Stat. 734 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 251.
62. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 251.
63. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 251.
64. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 254; see 26 U.S.C. § 6015(0.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
67. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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while the other two provisions, § 6015(c) and (f), are completely new
additions to the statute.68
1. Innocent Spouse Relief Under § 6015(b)
Section 6015(b) provides innocent spouses with complete relief from
liability if (1) a joint return has been made; (2) the tax understatement is
attributable to the non-claimant spouse's erroneous items; (3) the
claimant spouse proves that in signing the return he or she had no actual
or constructive knowledge of the understatement; (4) it is inequitable to
hold the claimant spouse liable for the tax deficiency; and (5) the
claimant spouse elects the benefits of § 6015(b) within two years after
the date the Secretary has begun collection activities. 69 In addition,
partial relief is available if the claimant did not know and had no reason
to know of the extent of the understatement.
70
Although it is based on former § 6013(e), § 6015(b) broadened the
scope of its predecessor.7' The tax understatement is no longer required
to be substantial, and the items to which it is attributable do not have to
be grossly erroneous.72 However, the 1998 amendment preserved the
innocence and equity requirements of former § 6013(e).73
2. Discretionary Relief Under § 6015( )
Section 6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to provide equitable relief at
his or her discretion if it is unfair to hold the taxpayer liable.74
Discretionary relief is authorized only if a requesting taxpayer cannot
obtain either innocent spouse or separation of liability relief under
§ 6015(b) or (c).75 The Secretary's determination must be made "taking
into account all the facts and circumstances. 76 On review to the courts,
the Secretary's determination is subject to the "abuse of discretion"
68. See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 331 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002).
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1).
70. Id. § 6015(b)(2). Before the 1998 amendment, it was unclear whether a court could grant
partial innocent spouse relief. 1998 BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 34, at 6 (citing Wiksell v.
Comm'r, 90 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1997)).
71. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(l)(B).
73. Id. § 6015(b)(1)(C)-(D); see also supra notes 36-37, 40-41 and accompanying text.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(l).
75. Id. § 6015(f)(2).
76. Id. § 6015(0(1).
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standard." In order to prevail, taxpayers appealing the denial of
discretionary relief must demonstrate that the Secretary exercised his or
her discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or
law.78
3. Separation of Liability Relief Under § 6015(c)
Unlike innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b) and discretionary relief
under § 6015(0, which are available to any spouse who meets the
prescribed statutory requirements, separation of liability relief is only
available to taxpayers who are divorced, legally separated, or living
apart for at least one year.79 This avenue of relief is thus limited to a
small percentage of the total number of taxpayers who apply for relief
from joint and several liability.80 Congress believed that an elective
system based on separate liability would provide better protection for
this class of taxpayers8' because the inequities experienced by taxpayers
facing collection attempts by the Internal Revenue Service (the Service)
are most appalling in cases of divorce or separation.
82
Josephine Berman's story, related to the Senate Committee on
Finance, is such a case.83 Although her husband left her in 1970, the
Service tried for years to recover a joint tax deficiency that was created
when the Service disallowed her husband's deductions for legal
77. See, e.g., Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2002); Alt v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.
306, 316 (2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 198 (2000).
78. Woodral v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i).
80. As of March 6, 2001, only 11% of the total number of meritorious innocent spouse claims
were received and decided by the Service under § 6015(c). See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH
CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM
AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, JCX-33-01, at 61 n.250 (J. Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter
2001 JOINT COMM. REPORT].
81. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 251-52 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55 (1998); see
also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1998 70 (J. Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter GENERAL
EXPLANATION].
82. See IRS Restructuring Hearing, supra note 53, at 144-65 (statements of Elizabeth Cockrell,
Svetlana Pejanovic, Karen J. Andreasen, and Josephine Berman, taxpayers); 1998 TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 33, at 49; see also Beck, supra note 1, at 328-30 (discussing the harshness and
unfairness of joint and several liability on separated or divorced women); Robert D. Hershey Jr.,
Married, Filing Jointly, with an LR.S. Headache, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at 1OBU (describing the
hardships experienced by Josephine Berman and Elizabeth Cockrell).
83. IRS Restructuring Hearing, supra note 53, at 153-55 (statement of Josephine Berman,
taxpayer).
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expenses incurred during litigation with his partner in an S corporation
and claimed on the Bermans' 1968, 1969, and 1970 joint returns. 84 At
the time of Ms. Berman's testimony in 1998, the Service had placed a
lien on her home, destroyed her credit rating, and seized her retirement
85savings. In part because of stories of inequities suffered by taxpayers
like Ms. Berman, the Senate Committee adopted the separation of
liability relief provision.86 Although this provision allows taxpayers to
separate their joint tax liability as if they had filed separate returns, there
are procedural and substantive limitations on its availability to taxpayers.
a) Operation of§ 6015(c)
Section 6015(c) is based on the separation of liability approach
proposed by the ABA, "in which liability for the tax follows
responsibility for the item, and represents a departure from strictly
proportional liability. '' 87 Separation of liability relief allows spouses to
divide their joint tax deficiency through the allocation of items of
income, deduction, and credit.88 When a taxpayer requests relief under
§ 6015(c), each item giving rise to a tax deficiency must first be
allocated to each spouse as if the spouses had filed separate returns.
89
Next, the claimant's tax liability for those items is calculated. 90 For
example, if the Service assesses a deficiency attributable to $70,000 of
the husband's unreported income and $30,000 of the wife's disallowed
deductions, and the husband is qualified to elect separation of liability
84. Id. at 153-54. Apparently, the Service concluded the claimed deductions were disallowed
because they were incurred to protect Mr. Berman's equity investment rather than his income
interest. Id. at 153.
85. Id. at 154-55.
86. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55.
87. ABA Proposal, supra note 37, at 7; see also 144 CONG. REC. S4474 (daily ed. May 7, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Graham).
88. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d) (2000).
89. Id. § 6015(d)(3)(A) ("[A]ny item giving rise to a deficiency on a joint return shall be allocated
to individuals filing the return in the same manner as it would have been allocated if the individuals
had filed separate returns for the taxable year.") (emphasis added). There are two exceptions to this
general allocation rule: (1) a tax benefit to the claimant under § 6015(d)(3)(B), see infra note 92;
and (2) fraud of one or both individuals authorizing the Secretary to provide for a different
allocation under § 6015(d)(3)(C).
90. Id. § 6015(d)(1) ("The portion of any deficiency on a joint return allocated to an individual
shall be the amount which bears the same ratio to such deficiency as the net amount of items taken
into account in computing the deficiency and allocable to the individual under paragraph (3) bears
to the net amount of all items taken into account in computing the deficiency.").
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relief under § 6015(c), 9' then his liability would be limited to seventy
percent of the total tax deficiency.
92
b) Limitations on § 6015(c) 's Availability
Congress has set several limitations on the availability of the
separation of liability relief provision. Section 6015 imposes two
technical limitations: (1) a taxpayer's request for relief must be made
within two years from the beginning of the Service's collection
activities,9 3 and (2) no credit or refund is available as a result of the
§ 6015(c) election. 94 Further, there are three additional limitations, so-
called "special rules, '95 that are intended to prevent inappropriate use of
separation of liability relief.96 These limitations originated in the Senate
amendment and were incorporated into the final bill by the Conference
agreement.97 First, neither spouse can elect to separate liability if assets
were transferred between the spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme
joined in by both spouses.98 Second, if the spouses transferred
disqualified assets for the principal purpose of tax avoidance, the
liability of the electing spouse is increased by the value of any assets so
91. See id. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i).
92. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252 (1998).
However, if the claimant spouse's deductions exceed the other spouse's income, the claimant is
liable for the excess deductions from which he or she has benefited. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(B)
("[A]n item otherwise allocable to an individual under subparagraph (A) shall be allocated to the
other individual filing the joint return to the extent the item gave rise to a tax benefit on the joint
return to the other individual.") (emphasis added).
For example, assume a $20,000 disallowed deduction, entirely allocated to the husband, resulted
in a $5,600 deficiency. The joint return listed $100,000 of wage income and $15,000 of self-
employment income allocable to the wife and husband respectively. Because the disallowed
deduction entirely offsets the $15,000 of the husband's income, the remaining $5,000 of the
$20,000 deduction offsets the wife's income. The liability for the deficiency is divided in proportion
to the amount of income offset for each spouse: the husband is liable for three-fourths of the
deficiency ($4,200), and the wife is liable for the remaining one-fourth ($1,400). See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 105-599, at 252-53.
93. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(B). An individual must elect limited liability under § 6015(c); if no
election has been made, the individual is still responsible for the full amount of the deficiency. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252.
94. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(g)(3).
95. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59 (1998).
96. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(C), (c)(4).
97. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59.
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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transferred. 99 Third, if an electing spouse had actual knowledge of "any
item giving rise to a deficiency" at the time he or she signed the return,
separation of liability relief is not available for any tax deficiency that is
attributed to that item (the actual knowledge exception). 00 The Service
has the burden of showing that a claimant has actual knowledge of an
item giving rise to a deficiency.'
0
'
In sum, § 6015(c)'s allocation rules allow a claimant spouse to
separate his or her liability for a jointly owed tax deficiency. Separation
of liability relief is only available to a limited class of taxpayers, and is
subject to many procedural and substantive limitations. Notably, if
taxpayers had actual knowledge of any item giving rise to a deficiency,
they cannot separate liability for that deficiency.
II. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
EXCEPTION TO § 6015(c): UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
AND ITEM ON A RETURN
Spouses with actual knowledge of any "item giving rise to a
deficiency" cannot obtain separation of liability relief for that
deficiency. 0 2 Congress' use of that phrase has sparked disagreement
over what "item" the taxpayer can know about to qualify for relief. The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and District of
Columbia Circuit, as well as the United States Tax Court, have all
agreed with the Service and adopted the underlying transaction
interpretation, thus barring taxpayers from obtaining relief if they knew
about the transaction that gave rise to a tax deficiency.' 0 3 However,
Judge Colvin agreed with the taxpayers in his dissent from the Tax Court
opinion and determined that this statutory phrase means an "item on the
return" so that the actual knowledge exception would bar relief only if
taxpayers knew that they were signing a joint return containing an
incorrectly claimed item. 104
99. See id. § 6015(c)(4).
100. See id. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
101. See id.
102. Id. ("If the Secretary demonstrates that an individual making an election under this
subsection had actual knowledge, at the time such individual signed the return, of any item giving
rise to a deficiency (or portion thereof) which is not allocable to such individual under subsection
(d), such election shall not apply to such deficiency (or portion).").
103. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d
326, 337 (5th Cir. 2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 195 (2000); see also supra note 20.
104. See Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 206-07 (Colvin, J., dissenting); see also supra note 21.
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A. The Underlying Transaction Interpretation
The first case to address this issue arose in the Fifth Circuit. In
Cheshire v. Commissioner,'0 5 Kathryn Cheshire's husband received
retirement distributions, more than half of which were used to pay off
the Cheshires' home mortgage and buy a new family car. 10 6 On the joint
return for that year, the Cheshires incorrectly claimed that only a small
portion of the retirement distributions was taxable. 107 Before signing the
return, Mrs. Cheshire questioned her husband about the tax
consequences of the retirement distributions, and he replied that an
accountant advised him that the proceeds used to pay off the mortgage
were nontaxable. 10 8 In fact, he had never consulted an accountant, and
the proceeds were taxable. 0 9 The Cheshires subsequently divorced, and
Mrs. Cheshire received the house and family car under a divorce
decree. 0 Consequently, under the joint and several liability that arises
from filing a joint return, the Service assessed a deficiency against Mrs.
Cheshire for understating the taxable amount of the retirement
distributions and other income."'
Mrs. Cheshire argued that § 6015(c) should relieve her of joint and
several liability because the phrase "item giving rise to a deficiency"
means "incorrect tax reporting of an item."'"12 In other words, she
contended that § 6015(c) relief should be available to her because she
did not have actual knowledge that the joint tax return incorrectly
omitted the retirement funds that should have been taxed."13 Affirming
the Tax Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Mrs. Cheshire
and held that "item" refers to "an item of income, deduction, or
credit."' 114 Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted the underlying transaction
interpretation of "item" under § 6015(c) and held that Mrs. Cheshire
could not separate her liability because she had "actual and clear
awareness" of Mr. Cheshire's retirement distributions and knew how the
105. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 329-30.
107. Id. at 330.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(l 1) (2000).
110. Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 330.
111. Id. at 329-30.
112, Id. at 335; see also supra note 21.
113. See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 335.
114. Id. at 337; see also supra note 20.
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distributions were spent." 15 In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit
relied on the plain meaning of the term "item" in § 6015 and other
sections of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) to support the meaning
adopted by the court.1 16 Additionally, the court suggested that Mrs.
Cheshire's interpretation "runs afoul of the general rule that ignorance of
the tax laws is not a defense to a tax deficiency."' 17 Because the court
found that the statute was not ambiguous on its face, it declined to give
any deference to § 6015's "inconclusive" and "ambiguous" legislative
history.l'
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Tax Court relied on the principle that
ignorance of the law is not a defense in rejecting Mrs. Cheshire's
argument.1 19 However, unlike the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit did not
recognize that a conflict existed between its interpretation of "item" and
numerous references in the legislative history of § 6015(c). 20 The
majority of the Tax Court resolved this conflict in favor of a broader
reading of the actual knowledge exception, relying in part on a self-
employment example in the report issued by the Joint Committee on
Taxation for the 1998 amendment. 2 ' The example posits a husband with
$20,000 of unreported self-employment income, $5,000 of which his
wife knew about, 122 and concludes that after the divorce, the wife could
not use § 6015(c) to separate joint and several liability for the $5,000, of
which she knew, although she could do so for the remaining $15,000, of
which she did not know. 23 The Tax Court concluded that in omitted
income situations, a taxpayer who actually knows about "the item of
115. Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 337; see also supra note 20.
116. See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 335-36 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(B) (2000), which refers to
"an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of one individual," and 26 U.S.C. § 61(a),
which defines "gross income" to include such "items" as compensation for services, interest, rents,
and royalties).
117. Id. at 336. The principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense describes the courts'
rejection of a taxpayer's claim for relief when the claimant "had all the facts at her disposal and
merely did not know the item was taxable or nondeductible." Jerome Borison, Innocent Spouse
Relief: A Call for Legislative and Judicial Liberalization, 40 TAx LAW. 819, 834 (1987).
118. Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 336-37.
119. See id. at 336; Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 196-97 (2000).
120. See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 337; Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 195.
121. Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 195-96 (citing GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 81, at 70). This
self-employment income example was included without variation in the Senate report, see S. REP.
No. 105-174, at 58 (1998), and the Conference Committee report, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-
599, at 252-53 (1998).
122. See Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 196.
123. See id.
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income that should have been reported on the return" has actual
knowledge of an item giving rise to the deficiency; such taxpayer is
therefore ineligible for separation of liability relief. 1
24
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Mitchell v. Commissioner.125 In Mitchell, the
taxpayer Mrs. Mitchell lost her husband who, prior to his sudden death,
received a retirement distribution and used the proceeds to purchase
treasury securities. 126 Mrs. Mitchell knew about the distribution and
what her husband did with it, although she did not know the correct tax
treatment of the distribution on a return. 127 The Service assessed a tax
deficiency against Mrs. Mitchell, but she argued that she should receive
separation of liability relief because the actual knowledge exception
should only apply if she knew that the retirement distributions were not
properly reported. 1
28
The court rejected Mrs. Mitchell's argument and held that the Service
was not required to prove that she had actual knowledge of the improper
tax treatment of an item. 2 9 The Mitchell court relied on the literal
meaning of the phrase "item giving rise to a deficiency" and rejected
Mrs. Mitchell's interpretation as "semantically awkward."' 30 Like the
Cheshire court, the Mitchell court considered the principle that
ignorance of the law is not a defense, and held that it was "unlikely that
Congress would have employed such subtle and ambiguous phrasing" to
overrule this well-established concept.'13 The court also noted that the
remedial purposes of § 6015 were satisfied by shifting the burden of
proving Mrs. Mitchell's actual knowledge of the item to the Service and
by requiring the Service to prove actual, and not merely constructive,
knowledge. 132 In sum, in adopting the underlying transaction
interpretation, courts have primarily relied on the plain meaning of the
word "item" and the principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.
124. Id. at 195.
125. 292 F.3d 800 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
126. Id. at 801.
127. Id. at 801-02.
128. See id. at 805.
129. Id. at 806.
130. Id. at 805.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 805-06; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (2000).
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B. The Item on a Return Interpretation
Dissenting from the Tax Court's decision in Cheshire,"' Judge
Colvin agreed with the taxpayer's interpretation of "item" and concluded
that the history and context of § 6015(c) required the Service to prove a
taxpayer's actual knowledge that an item was incorrectly reported on a
return. 134 Judge Colvin reasoned that the legislative history consistently
supported this interpretation, pointing to the Senate Committee on
Finance report, which stated that: "'if the IRS proves that the electing
spouse had actual knowledge that an item on a return is incorrect, the
election will not apply to the extent any deficiency is attributable to such
item." 3 5 Further, another portion of the report stated:
"The Committee intends that this election [to separate liability]
be available to limit the liability of spouses for tax attributable to
items of which they had no knowledge. The Committee is
concerned that taxpayers not be allowed to abuse these rules by
knowingly signing false returns, or by transferring assets for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of tax by the use of this
election."1
36
Thus, Judge Colvin determined that the Senate Committee intended the
actual knowledge exception to apply to taxpayers who knew that a return
was incorrect-in other words, to taxpayers who were "knowingly
signing false returns."'37
In addition, Judge Colvin considered the floor remarks by Senators
Graham and D'Amato persuasive. 138 Both senators were members of the
Senate Committee on Finance, and they introduced the amendments to
the actual knowledge exception. 139 Senator Graham commented that the
Secretary had the burden of demonstrating that a spouse making a
§ 6015(c) election "'had actual knowledge of the conditions within that
return which led to this deficiency"' in order to be "'100 percent
responsible."",140 Similarly, Senator D'Amato explained the policy
133. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 202-09 (2000).
134. Id. at 203-07.
135. Id. at 204-05 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59 (1998)).
136. Id. at 205 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55-56).
137. id. at 205-06.
138. Id. at 205.
139. See supra note 57.
140. Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 205 (Colvin, J., dissenting) (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S4474 (daily ed.
May 7, 1998)).
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behind the actual knowledge exception as alleviating lawmakers'
concerns "'that some taxpayers may try to abuse the innocent spouse
rules by knowingly signing false returns, or transferring assets for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of tax, and then claim to be
innocent.' ' 141 Because "'no one would want to open the door to that type
of fraud,"' the actual knowledge exception was included in the bill.
142
Finally, Judge Colvin noted that the language used by the Conference
Committee 143 was identical to that used by the Senate Committee, 144 and
determined that this legislative history "unequivocally show[ed]"
Congress' intent to require the Commissioner to prove that the spouse
knew his or her tax return was incorrect. 45 Accordingly, Judge Colvin
concluded that "Congress intended the knowledge requirement to mean
knowledge that the return is incorrect, not knowledge that there was an
income-producing activity or transaction."'
' 46
C. Treasury Regulations
Having won in Cheshire and Mitchell, the Service, acting through the
Treasury, promptly fortified its foothold with the Final Regulations,
published on July 18, 2002.' 4' The Regulations interpret the actual
knowledge exception differently depending on whether a case involves
omitted income, an erroneous deduction, or fictitious or inflated
deductions or credits. 48 For cases where a spouse omits income, the
Service adopted the holding of the Tax Court in Cheshire.149 In such
cases, the standard is whether the requesting spouse actually knew about
the item, including the receipt of the income,' 50 rather than simply
knowing about the tax consequences of the item.'15 On the other hand, in
cases where a spouse has claimed an erroneous deduction, the Service
141. Id. (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S4474).
142. Id. (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S4474).
143. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253 (1998).
144. See supra text accompanying note 135.
145. Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 206 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted).
147. Relief from Joint and Several Liability, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,278 (July 18, 2002) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pts. I, 602); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6015(h) (2000).
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i) (2002); Summary of Comments and Explanation of
Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,282-83 (July 18, 2002).
149. See Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 47,282.
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(A).
151. Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 47,282.
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adopted a standard developed by the Tax Court in King v.
Commissioner,152 where the relevant inquiry is whether the requesting
spouse actually knew about the factual circumstances that made the item
unallowable as a deduction, rather than the proper tax consequences of
the item. 53 In cases involving fictitious or inflated deductions or credits,
the standard is whether the spouse actually knew that the expenditure
was not incurred, or not incurred to that extent.
54
Before these Regulations became final, commentators criticized the
Service's interpretation of the actual knowledge exception, claiming that
it was contrary to the provision's legislative history. 55 However, the
Service reasoned that narrowing these standards would give the actual
knowledge exception a superfluous meaning. 156 The Service also
rejected these criticisms based on the self-employment income example
contained in the legislative history. 157 The Service read this example to
refer to both the income tax and the self-employment tax deficiency
attributable to the $5,000 portion of the self-employment income about
which the wife had actual knowledge. 158 While the wife's knowledge of
her husband's self-employment income might also imply that she knew
that the omitted $5,000 is subject to income tax, it does not mean that
she is aware of an additional self-employment tax on the omitted income
because many taxpayers are unaware of that tax. 159 Because this example
did not indicate that the Service must prove that the wife actually knew
that self-employment income was subject to income tax and
152. 116 T.C. 198, 204 (2001).
153. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(B)(1); Summary of Comments and Explanation of
Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 47,283.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(B)(2).
155. See, e.g., Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Innocent Spouse Regs., 2001 TAX NOTES
TODAY 112-100 (June 11, 2001) [hereinafter June 2001 IRS Hearing] (statement of David L.
Keating, Senior Counsel, National Taxpayers Union); AICPA Suggests Changes to Innocent Spouse
Regs., 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-26 (July 11,2001).
156. See June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 1 102, 107 (remarks of Judy Wall, Branch
Chief, IRS Procedure and Administration) ("In that legislative history where they talk about
knowingly signing false returns .... there are several limitations in the statute. One of which is
fraud .... I'm having trouble understanding why we would have needed the separate, actual
knowledge limitation if we already had the fraud limitation ... .
157. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
158. See Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 47,282; accord
June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 11 108, 111-12 (remarks of Bridget Finkenaur, Attorney-
Advisor, IRS Procedure and Administration).
159. See June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 11 108, 111-12 (remarks of Bridget Finkenaur,
Attorney-Advisor, IRS Procedure and Administration).
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self-employment tax, the Service rejected the standard that actual
knowledge of the item means actual knowledge of the proper tax
treatment of the item. 1
60
Contrary to the Regulations' approach, the National Taxpayer
Advocate, the head of the Service's Taxpayer Advocate Service,
recommended eliminating the actual knowledge requirement from
§ 6015(c) because it "frustrates [c]ongressional intent" to have
separation of liability relief as "a largely mechanical application of law
that permits divorced or separated taxpayers to end their joint financial
obligation to the IRS.'' According to the National Taxpayer
Advocate's statistics, the denial rate of all claims under the actual
knowledge standard is only slightly lower than the denial rates under the
constructive knowledge standard, even though the constructive
knowledge standard, which is more difficult for a claimant spouse to
prove, should logically lead to significantly higher denial rates.
162
Courts and the Treasury have interpreted the actual knowledge
exception under § 6015(c) to disallow separation of liability relief to
claimants with actual knowledge of an underlying transaction. 63 In
contrast, Judge Colvin's dissent in Cheshire urged a pro-taxpayer
interpretation of this exception, under which only claimants who knew
they had signed an incorrect return would be barred from § 6015(c)
relief.164 Additionally, the Regulations' approach, interpreting the actual
knowledge exception as three different standards, has been met with
substantial criticism from both commentators and the National Taxpayer
Advocate. 1
65
160. See Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. at 47,282.
161. 2000 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 91, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub2lO4-2000.pdf (last visited July 26, 2003); accord 2001 JOINT
COMM. REPORT, supra note 80, at 61 n.250 (citing Letter from IRS to the Joint Comm. Staff (Apr.
27, 2001)).
162. 2000 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 161,
at 91.
163. See supra Part ILA, C.
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. See supra notes 155, 161-62 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CONSTRUCTIVE OR ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE
REQUIREMENT UNDER § 6015(b) AND FORMER § 6013(e)
INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
Although § 6015(c) separation of liability relief has no statutory
antecedent, 166 there is a significant body of case law interpreting
§ 6015(b)'s and former § 6013(e)'s requirement that to be innocent,
taxpayers must have no actual or constructive knowledge of a tax
understatement. 167 In rejecting the taxpayers' interpretation of "item" in
§ 6015(c), the Cheshire and Mitchell courts relied in part on the general
principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense. 68 Courts used this
same principle in interpreting the knowledge requirements of
§ 6015(b) 169 and former § 6013(e). 170
A. Two Standards for Two Lines of Cases
The knowledge element of former § 6013(e) required spouses signing
a joint return to not know, and have no reason to know, that there was a
substantial understatement of tax.' 7' Courts developed two different
standards for the meaning of "understatement," drawing a line between
cases involving omitted income and cases involving erroneous
deductions. 72 Courts have agreed that in omission of income cases, the
claimant spouse must not know or have reason to know of the
underlying transaction that produced the income (the knowledge of the
transaction test).173 But in erroneous deduction cases, courts are divided:
the Tax Court continues to apply the same knowledge of the transaction
test, 74 while some circuit courts have adopted an alternate test
announced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Price v. Commissioner.175 The Price standard goes beyond evaluating
166. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
167. See Beck, supra note 1, at 352-56.
168. Mitchell, 292 F.3d at 805; Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
169. See, e.g., Mitchell, 292 F.3d at 804; Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 334-35.
170. See, e.g., Price v. Comm'r, 887 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1989).
171. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1994) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6015 (2000)); see also
supra text accompanying note 29. The 1998 amendment deleted the word "substantial." GENERAL
EXPLANATION, supra note 81, at 71; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C) (2000).
172. See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 333.
173. Id.
174. See id. (citing Bokum v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 126, 151 (1990)).
175. 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989). See Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 333.
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the spouse's knowledge of the transaction underlying a deduction, and
instead considers whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer in the spouse's
position could be expected to know of the understatement. 176
Although the Price court expanded the relief available to a spouse in
erroneous deduction cases, it cautioned that "[o]f itself, ignorance of the
attendant legal or tax consequences of an item which gives rise to a
deficiency is no defense for one seeking to obtain innocent spouse
relief."'177 Courts have consistently rejected the theory that a person's
ignorance of the tax consequences of his or her actions should be
considered a factor in the application of the knowledge requirement. 178
However, the other factors applied by courts vary widely.' 79 In
determining whether the spouse has no knowledge of the
understatement, courts have considered a claimant spouse's level of
education, involvement in the family business or finances, the culpable
spouse's deceit and ability to fool others, the culpable spouse's
indictment or conviction on a related offense, and the lavishness of the
family's expenditures compared to past spending patterns and standard
of living.1
80
B. Courts Uniformly Apply the Principle That Ignorance of the Law Is
Not a Defense
While courts acknowledge that the knowledge of the transaction test
conflicts with the plain meaning of the innocent spouse provision, which
limits relief to spouses with no knowledge of the understatement,' 81 they
nonetheless accept this deviation from the statute's plain meaning
because "it avoids 'acceptance of an ignorance of the law defense.""
'182
The principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense is both well-
established 83 and solidly rooted in common law.'
84
176. See Price, 887 F.2d at 963, 965.
177. See id. at 963-64.
178. See Borison, supra note I 17, at 833-34.
179. See id. at 831-34; Beck, supra note 1, at 351-56.
180. See Borison, supra note 117, at 830-34.
181. See Price, 887 F.2d at 963 n.9; Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 n.14 (5th Cir.
1975).
182. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 333 n.16 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Price, 887 F.2d at 963
n.9; Sanders, 509 F.2d at 169 n.14).
183. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
184. See Borison, supra note 117, at 834.
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The seminal case establishing this principle in the innocent spouse
context is McCoy v. Commissioner.185 In McCoy, the Tax Court denied
innocent spouse relief to a wife who was unaware of the tax
consequences of income realized by her husband when he incorporated a
partnership with assumed liabilities exceeding the basis of assets
transferred. 186 The McCoy court rooted its decision in the legislative
history of § 6013(e), which required "complete ignorance of the
omission [of income]" before taxpayers could qualify for innocent
spouse relief. 1
87
Relying on the congressional mandate of complete innocence for
§ 6013(e) relief, other courts have followed McCoy and held that
ignorance of the law cannot be a defense to tax violations. These courts
have charged claimants with a duty to inquire into the proper tax
treatment of omitted income, claimed deductions, and credits.'88 The
Price court suggested that where a spouse admitted knowing about
unreported funds her husband had embezzled, but did not know that
embezzled funds constituted taxable income, "she is considered as a
matter of law to have reason to know of the substantial understatement
and thereby is effectively precluded from establishing to the
contrary."' 189 Further, the courts recognized the practical problems
associated with using the ignorance of the law defense in the criminal
law and federal income tax law, 190 such as the difficulty of refuting the
defense and determining whether the claimant was at fault by not
knowing the law.' 9'
When the Cheshire and Mitchell courts rejected the item on a return
interpretation of the term "item," both courts relied in part on the
principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.' 92 The principle was
185. 57 T.C. 732 (1972).
186. See id. at 733-35 (citing 26 U.SC. § 357(c) (1970)).
187. Id. at 734-35 (alteration in original).
188. See Price v. Comm'r, 887 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Reser v. Comm'r, 112 F.3d
1258, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1997) (charging a spouse with a duty to inquire); Von Kalinowski v.
Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081, 1086 (2001) (noting that "where a spouse has a duty to inquire as
to the legitimacy of a deduction, failure to satisfy such duty may result in constructive knowledge of
the understatement being imputed to her").
189. Price, 887 F.2d at 964 (emphasis added).
190. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 n.14 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 47, at 363-64 (1972)).
191. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 190, at 363-64.
192. Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d
326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
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previously applied as part of the innocence requirement under the
innocent spouse relief provision. The Cheshire and Mitchell courts
extended this principle to separation of liability cases under new
§ 6015(c). 193
IV. THE PHRASE "ITEM GIVING RISE TO A DEFICIENCY"
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN ITEM OF INCOME,
DEDUCTION, OR CREDIT INCORRECTLY REPORTED ON A
RETURN
Although courts have demonstrated their unwillingness to interpret
the actual knowledge exception narrowly to give an electing taxpayer
broader protection with separation of liability relief,194 this hesitation is
unjustifiable. The structure, text, and legislative history of the actual
knowledge exception indicate that an "item giving rise to a deficiency"
means an item of income, deduction, or credit incorrectly reported on a
return.195 Therefore, the actual knowledge exception should be limited
only to those spouses who, at the time of signing a joint return, knew
that the item was incorrectly reported on the return. 196 Rejecting the item
on a return interpretation, the Treasury's Regulations have created three
knowledge tests. 197 However, these tests have no support in the text,
structure, or legislative history of § 6015(c). 198 Additionally, policy
considerations strongly favor adopting a narrow reading of the
knowledge exception, thereby permitting taxpayers to obtain separation
of liability relief unless they have actual knowledge that an item was
incorrectly reported on a tax return.' 99 Congress and the Treasury should
amend § 6015(c) and the Regulations, respectively, to clearly state that
the actual knowledge exception requires the Secretary to demonstrate
that at the time of signing the joint return, the taxpayer knew that the
item was reported incorrectly. 20
0
193. Mitchell, 292 F.3d at 805; Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 336; Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183,
196-97 (2000).
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See infra Part IV.A-B.
196. See infra Part IV.A-B.
197. See supra Part 1I.C.
198. See infra Part IV.C.
199. See infra Part IV.D.
200. See infra Part V.E.
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A. Structure and Text of§ 6015
When construing the actual knowledge exception to separation of
liability relief under § 6015(c), the Cheshire and Mitchell courts relied in
part on case law that interpreted the innocence requirement of § 6015(b)
and former § 6013(e).20 1 However, the courts' analogy is inapposite
because there are several major differences between the knowledge
provisions of innocent spouse relief and separation of liability relief.
First, to qualify for innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b), an electing
spouse has the burden of proving complete innocence-that is, the
spouse must have no actual or constructive knowledge of the
202understatement. In contrast, the knowledge provision under separation
of liability relief is not a prerequisite requirement for the taxpayer to
prove, but an exception that bars the provision's application and must be
proved by the Service.20 3 This distinction, coupled with the remedial
goals of § 6015,204 requires that courts read separation of liability relief
liberally 20 5 and the actual knowledge exception narrowly.
Second, the requirement of innocent spouse relief covers both a
taxpayer's actual and constructive knowledge.20 6 In contrast, the
knowledge exception to separation of liability relief only bars taxpayers
207who have actual knowledge of items giving rise to a deficiency. To
incorporate the principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense from
the case law interpreting former § 6013(e) is to charge taxpayers with a
duty of inquiry about the legal consequences of omitting income,
claiming a deduction, or credit. 20 8 However, barring taxpayers with
constructive knowledge from electing separation of liability relief
contradicts the text, structure, and history of § 6015(C). 20 9
201. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d
326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002); see also supra Part III.B.
202. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(l)(C) (2000); see also supra Part Ill; cf McCoy v. Comm'r, 57
T.C. 732, 735 (1972) (noting that former § 6013(e) required "complete ignorance of the omission
[of income]") (alteration in original).
203. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C); supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[W]e are guided by the familiar
canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate
its purposes."); accordPeyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).
206. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C); see also supra Part Ill.
207. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
208. See Cheshire Amici Brief, supra note 53, at 22.
209. Id.
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Further, Congress specifically removed the concept of constructive
knowledge from the actual knowledge exception of § 6015(c), noting
that "[s]uch actual knowledge [that an item on a return is incorrect] must
be established by the evidence and shall not be inferred based on
indications that the electing spouse had a reason to know."2 10 The
Mitchell court doubted that Congress would rely on a "subtle,
ambiguous, obscure and imprecise device" like the actual knowledge
exception to make ignorance of the law a defense. 21' However, Congress
emphasized in both the text of the statute21 2 and the accompanying
legislative history2 3 that only a showing of actual knowledge should bar
separation of liability relief. By disallowing the Service's use of inferred
evidence 214 to prove a taxpayer's actual knowledge, Congress eliminated
the taxpayer's duty of inquiry.21 5 This restriction renders the principle
that ignorance of the law is not a defense inapplicable to cases involving
the separation of liability provision.216 Thus, to give effect to this
legislative intent, the principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense,
developed in cases involving the innocence requirement of innocent
spouse relief, should not be extended to the context of the actual
knowledge exception to separation of liability relief.
21 7
Finally, the subject of a spouse's knowledge is different under the two
forms of relief: under innocent spouse relief, a taxpayer cannot have
actual or constructive knowledge of an "understatement" of tax,218 while
under separation of liability relief, a taxpayer cannot have actual
knowledge of an "item giving rise to a deficiency., 219 In Cheshire, the
Service argued that if Congress intended the knowledge exception to
extend only to an "item on a return," it could have referred instead to "an
item of income that should have been reported on the return" or "actual
210. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253 (1998).
211. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
212. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
213. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; supra text accompanying note 210.
214. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; supra text accompanying note 210.
215. See Cheshire Amici Brief, supra note 53, at 12; see also supra notes 188-89 and
accompanying text.
216. See Cheshire Amici Brief, supra note 53, at 12-14.
217. See id. Contra Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire v.
Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2002).
218. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C) (2000).
219. Id. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
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knowledge of the incorrect tax reporting of an item on a return."22 Thus,
the Service concluded that the item on a return meaning could not have
been intended.22' Congress, however, extended the actual knowledge
exception to an "item giving rise to a deficiency," a phrase that was
unknown to the pre-1998 innocent spouse relief. Congress' choice of
new language implies its rejection of the line of cases interpreting the
former innocent spouse provision. If Congress intended to incorporate
the judicial knowledge of the transaction standard that was developed
under the knowledge of an understatement requirement of former
§ 6013(e) and current § 6015(b), it probably would have referred to "the
actual knowledge of an understatement" in § 6015(c). 222 But Congress
did not do so, and chose instead to use new and different language in
§ 6015(c).
This new phrase chosen by Congress--"item giving rise to a
deficiency"--is ambiguous. 223  It can mean an income-producing
transaction, as urged by the Service and adopted by the Cheshire and
Mitchell courts.2 24 However, it can also mean an item on a joint return.225
The Code contains references to both of these potential readings. 22
6
Because the meaning of the actual knowledge exception is ambiguous, 7
the use of legislative history is appropriate to ascertain the meaning of
this phrase.228
220. Brief for the Appellee, Commissioner of Internal Revenue at 36, Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282
F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-60855) [hereinafter Cheshire IRS Brief].
221. See id.
222. The term understatement under § 6015(b) and former § 6013(e) covers cases of omitted
income, erroneously claimed deduction or credit. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 and
Part II1.A for discussion of courts' interpretation of this term. Thus, Congress did not have to
introduce the new term "item" to cover all cases that may cause a tax deficiency; it could have done
so by preserving the terminology of innocent spouse relief.
223. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 202-03 (2000) (Colvin, J., dissenting). Contra Cheshire
v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2002).
224. See Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 335,
337.
225. See Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 203 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
226. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) refers to "item" as an underlying transaction by providing
that gross income includes various items listed in that section. In contrast, 26 U.S.C. § 57(a) refers
to various "items of tax preference" defined by reference to tax consequences. Cheshire, 115 T.C. at
203 n.l (Colvin, J., dissenting).
227. Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 202-03 (Colvin, J., dissenting). Contra Cheshire, 282 F.3d at 336-37
(concluding that the meaning of the statute is plain and declining to give any deference to the
legislative history).
228. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 n.1 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[w]henever there is some uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, it is
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As the Mitchell court noted, the meaning of the term "item" is defined
nowhere in the Internal Revenue Code and is unremarkably general.229
Because of the term's potential breadth of meaning,230 courts should not
analyze the word "item" in isolation and without reference to context.
23
'
Looking at the context and structure of § 6015, the phrase "item giving
rise to a deficiency" and its variation, "item [that] gave rise to a tax
benefit, ' ' 32 are used exclusively in the context of separation of liability
relief. There are four references to this phrase in § 6015, three of which
appear in the rule for how to allocate items of income, deduction, and
credit between spouses, 233  and the fourth appears in the actual
knowledge exception.23 4 The text of the allocation rules implies that "an
amount on a return can be allocated, i.e., split" between spouses, while
"an underlying transaction or activity cannot," which supports the item
on a return interpretation. 5 Under the rules of statutory construction,
identical words or phrases used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning, especially where the word or phrase
is repeatedly used in the act.236 This principle supports interpreting the
prudent to examine its legislative history" and quoting Judge Learned Hand's advice in Lehigh
Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914), that statutes "'should be construed,
not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them');
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) ("Where the language and
purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in
interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative
history to reach a conclusion."); Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 204 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
229. See Mitchell, 292 F.3d at 805.
230. The word "item" is used in the Code more than two thousand times, including fifteen times
in § 6015(c). See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2002).
231. See, e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 434 (2002) (stating that "[ilt is a
fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme") (internal citations omitted); Deal v.
United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (noting that a "fundamental principle of statutory
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) [is] that the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used").
232. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(B) (2000); see also supra note 92.
233. The three references are: (1) the subheading of the allocation rule, "Allocation of Items
Giving Rise to the Deficiency," 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3); (2) the mechanics of allocation, see 26
U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(A); supra note 89; and (3) the tax benefit exception to the usual operation of
the allocation rule, see 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(B); supra note 92.
234. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C).
235. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 206 (2000) (Colvin, J., dissenting).
236. See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting the presumption that
"equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute"); Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (restating the "normal rule of statutory construction that
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning").
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term "item" giving rise to a deficiency or tax benefit consistently
throughout the separation of liability relief provision.
B. Legislative History of the Actual Knowledge Exception
The structural and textual analysis of the phrase "item giving rise to a
deficiency" is supported by the history of § 6015's adoption. The
legislative history demonstrates that Congress enacted the actual
knowledge exception to prevent taxpayers who knowingly sign false
returns from abusing separation of liability relief. In accordance with
this purpose, Congress limited the scope of the taxpayer's knowledge to
the knowledge of an error on a return.
1. Purpose of the Actual Knowledge Exception
The legislative history of separation of liability relief begins with the
237 whc teSenate report, in which the actual knowledge exception was listed
among the three "special rules" that were adopted "to prevent the
inappropriate use of the election., 238 The Senate Committee stated that it
created these special rules to prevent taxpayers from abusing separation
of liability relief by knowingly signing false returns and by transferring
assets to avoid the payment of tax.239 Two special rules address only
asset transfers in fraudulent and tax avoidance schemes. 240 The third
special rule is the actual knowledge exception.241 When the Senate
Committee, Senator D'Amato, and the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation stated that taxpayers should not be allowed to abuse these rules
"by knowingly signing false returns, or by transferring assets for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of tax,, 242 the reference to "knowingly
signing false returns" must refer to the actual knowledge exception
because it is the only special rule left that does not involve asset
transfers. Thus, the legislative history shows that the intended purpose of
237. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55-60 (1998); see also supra notes 52-62 and accompanying
text.
238. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253-54 (1998); supra
text accompanying notes 95-101.
239. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55-56, 59; see supra text accompanying note 136.
240. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(4) (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes
98-99.
241. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C). See also supra note 102 for statutory text.
242. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 55-56; GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 81, at 67; accord 144
CONG. REC. S4474 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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the actual knowledge exception was to prevent taxpayers who
knowingly sign false returns from taking advantage of § 6015(c) relief.
Confronted with this same legislative history suggesting the item on a
return meaning, the Service argued that this interpretation would render
the actual knowledge exception superfluous. 243 The Service asserted that
this interpretation makes the actual knowledge exception unnecessary in
light of the fraud provision which authorizes the Secretary to reallocate
items if there is fraud by one or both spouses.244 However, the Service's
objection is without merit for the following reasons.
The actual knowledge exception targets the taxpayer's ability to elect
§ 6015(c) relief in general, unlike the fraud provision that only limits the
application of allocation rules. There are five limitations on separation of
liability relief. Two of them limit the allocation of items to spouses that
otherwise qualify for § 6015(c) relief, including the fraud provision on
which the Service relied.245 In contrast, the other three special rules,
including the actual knowledge exception, limit the claimant's ability to
elect separation of liability relief in general.246 Furthermore, the fraud
restriction allows the Secretary to reallocate items in his or her discretion
whereas the actual knowledge exception is a non-discretionary provision
that automatically bars § 6015(c) relief for a deficiency attributable to
items that a spouse knew were reported incorrectly.247 Because the fraud
restriction provides for discretionary reallocation of items, while the
actual knowledge exception bars relief outright upon the Secretary's
proof that a claimant spouse knew about errors on a return when he or
she signed it, the application of these two provisions is distinctly
different, and the item on a return interpretation will not render the
actual knowledge exception superfluous. Therefore, the purpose of the
actual knowledge exception, derived from the provision's legislative
243. See June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 102, 107 (remarks of Judy Wall, Branch
Chief, IRS Procedure and Administration); supra note 156 and accompanying text.
244. See June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 102, 107 (remarks of Judy Wall, Branch
Chief, IRS Procedure and Administration); supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also 26
U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(C); supra note 89.
245. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(C); supra note 89. The other allocation limitation is the tax
benefit provision. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(B). See also supra note 92 for statutory text.
246. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253-54 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59; see also
supra note 238 and accompanying text. The first two limitations are placed in 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d),
which covers "[aillocation of deficiency," whereas the other three limitations are in 26 U.S.C.
§ 6015(c), which covers "[p]rocedures to limit liability for taxpayers no longer married or taxpayers
legally separated or not living together."
247. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(3)(C), (c)(3)(C).
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history, can be effectuated only by giving the exception its intended item
on a return meaning.
2. Scope of the Actual Knowledge Exception
The scope of the actual knowledge exception must be interpreted in
light of the legislative intent to prevent abuse of § 6015(c) relief by
spouses who knowingly sign false returns. Introducing the floor
amendments to the actual knowledge exception,248 Senator Graham
referred to its scope as actual knowledge of "the conditions within that
return which led to this deficiency,, 249 the joint return's contents, 250 and
"the circumstances in the return that led to the deficiency." 251 The Senate
report explained that the Service would be required to prove "that the
electing spouse had actual knowledge that an item on a return is
incorrect. 252 The Conference Committee report,253 the Joint Committee
General Explanation of the 1998 Tax Legislation,254 and another Joint
Committee document prepared three years after the statutory
enactment 255 are all in accord with the Senate report.
While the Fifth Circuit in Cheshire rejected § 6015(c)'s legislative
history as ambiguous and inconclusive,256 the Cheshire Tax Court
majority noted the contradiction between its holding and the legislative
history.2 57 The majority resolved the conflict by treating the legislative
history as only an example.258 However, as Judge Colvin noted in his
dissent, Congress' statements describing the scope of the actual
248. See 144 CONG. REC. S4473-74 (daily ed. May 7, 1998); supra note 57.
249. 144 CONG. REC. S4474; see also supra text accompanying note 140.
250. 144 CONG. REC. S4474. Although this statement was made in conjunction with the duress
portion of the actual knowledge exception amendments, the scope of the exception is the same
whether it is applied to a taxpayer under duress or not.
251. Id.
252. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 59 (1998); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
253. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 253 (1998).
254. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 81, at 70.
255. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO THE
INNOCENT SPOUSE, OFFERS-IN-COMPROMISE, INSTALLMENT AGREEMENT, AND TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, JCX-22-0 1, at 3 (J. Comm. Print 2001).
256. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2002); cf Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d
800, 804-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (no discussion of legislative history or intent).
257. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 195 (2000) ("Arguably, this statement [that the IRS
must prove that "the electing spouse had actual knowledge that an item on a return is incorrect"]
conflicts with our knowledge standard for purposes of section 6015(c)(3)(C).").
258. Id.
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knowledge exception are explanations of the general rule, not examples,
because Committees have a specific way of introducing examples by
using the preceding phrase "for example., 259 Indeed, the Conference
Committee report contains an actual example in the paragraph
immediately following this explanation of the statutory rule. 260
The allegedly inconsistent self-employment income example 261 can be
reconciled with the legislative intent Congress expressed elsewhere.
First, the example's purpose was to demonstrate how a tax deficiency is
allocated between spouses when one spouse knows of a portion of the
other spouse's omitted income. The example does not address the scope
of the spouse's knowledge. 62 The Senate report, where the example
originated, placed it in a section titled "[t]ax deficiencies, '263 explaining
how the § 6015(d) allocation rules function. During the conference, the
example was moved to the "special rules" discussion264 immediately
following the explanation of the actual knowledge provision's scope. 265
These structural changes should not distort the example's main purpose:
to demonstrate the allocation of a tax deficiency if a claimant knows of
some, but not all, of the other spouse's items giving rise to a deficiency.
Second, the use of self-employment income in the example creates a
presumption that if the wife knows about her husband's self-
employment income, she necessarily knows it is taxable. Therefore, she
should also know that the omission of self-employment income from the
return is incorrect. The Service has responded to this argument by
attempting to stretch the example to cover a self-employment tax
deficiency as well as an income tax deficiency. 266 The Service's reading
of the legislative history has no textual support, given that there is no
indication that Congress intended the example to illustrate anything
other than the allocation rules when one spouse has actual knowledge
259. Id. at 206 n.3 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
260. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253 (1998).
261. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
262. See Cheshire, 115 T.C. at 206 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
263. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 57-58 (1998).
264. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; see also supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
265. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 253.
266. See Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,282
(July 18, 2002); June 2001 IRS Hearing, supra note 155, 108, 111-12 (remarks of Bridget
Finkenaur, Attomey-Advisor, IRS Procedure and Administration); see also supra text
accompanying notes 158-60.
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about a portion of the item.267 This dislocated example should not
overcome the strong evidence that Congress intended the actual
knowledge exception to cover only cases where taxpayers actually know
that they have signed a return that contains an incorrect item. Thus, the
scope of the actual knowledge exception should be interpreted
consistently with the legislative history of § 6015(c) to mean actual
knowledge that an item on a return is incorrect.
C. Treasury Regulations
The Regulations provide three distinct tests under § 6015(c) for cases
that involve an omission of income, erroneous deduction, and fictitious
or inflated deduction or credit.268 However, Congress established only
one standard: whether a taxpayer has "actual knowledge ... of an[] item
giving rise to a deficiency., 269 This standard is distinct from the
prerequisite of complete innocence, which taxpayers must prove to
qualify for relief under § 6015(b).2 70 The Treasury improperly split
Congress' single standard into three tests that roughly parallel the case
law interpreting former § 6013(e). 27' This division is artificial and is not
based on the structure, text or legislative history of § 6015(C). 27 2 When
Congress intends to treat income, deduction, or credit separately, it does
so. 273 The more accurate reading of the knowledge exception is that it is
one standard that applies equally to all types of cases: it bars relief to a
taxpayer who, at the time of signing the return, has actual knowledge
that the "item" listed on a return-be it omitted income, an improperly
claimed deduction or credit-gave rise to a deficiency on a return.
D. Policy Considerations
First and foremost, separation of liability relief must be interpreted
liberally in light of its broad remedial purpose.274 Courts should
267. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; S. REP. No. 105-174, at 58.
268. See supra Part I1.C.
269. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (2000).
270. Id. § 6015(b)(1)(C); see also supra Part 11.
271. See supra Part 1ll.
272. See supra Part IV.A-B.
273. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6015(d)(2) (distinguishing allocation of disallowed credit from the
general allocation principles); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252-53 (1998); S. REP. No.
105-174, at 57-59 (1998).
274. See supra notes 45-48, 205 and accompanying text.
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recognize Congress' intent behind § 6015(c)-to provide a different,
mechanical-like reliefe75 to divorced or separated taxpayers, free from
the fact-dependent inquiry of the innocence and equity requirements of
§ 6015(b) relief.276 Applying case law interpreting § 6015(b) innocent
spouse relief to the new separation of liability provision undermines
Congress' intent to create a new and different remedy from prior
innocent spouse law.277
The Service successfully argued to the Cheshire Tax Court majority
that the item on a return interpretation would render the actual
knowledge exception meaningless because potentially any spouse who is
not a certified public accountant or tax attorney would be allowed to
escape paying income tax.278 Yet, this argument should be rejected as
having no merit because separation of liability relief was created to
allow divorced or separated taxpayers to separate responsibilities for
only their individual share of a tax deficiency.279 If one spouse obtains
separation of liability relief, the Service is not left without a taxpayer
from whom it can collect tax deficiencies. Instead, the Service can
collect from the other spouse, whose income, deduction or credit
actually produced the deficiency. The McCoy court's fear that
potentially both spouses could be found innocent, leaving the Service
without a taxpayer to collect from 280 is thus unfounded.
E. Proposed Amendment
Congress should amend § 6015(c) to clarify the meaning of the actual
knowledge exception. Instead of its current ambiguous phrasing,28' the
statute should read: "If the Secretary demonstrates that an individual
making an election under this subsection had actual knowledge that an
item of income, deduction or credit is incorrectly reported on a return,
the election will not apply to the extent any deficiency is attributable to
275. See 2000 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
161, at 91.
276. See Cheshire Amici Brief, supra note 53, at 14; supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
277. See Cheshire Amici Brief, supra note 53, at 18.
278. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 197 (2000); Cheshire IRS Brief, supra note 220, at 41.
279. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252 (1998).
280. McCoy v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 732, 735 (1972); Borison, supra note 117, at 834.
281. See supra note 102 for statutory text of 26 U.S.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (2000).
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such item. 282 Alternatively, the Treasury could amend its Regulations
using similar language, thereby giving proper effect to Congress' intent
behind the actual knowledge exception.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of the innocent spouse relief provision has been
heavily litigated since its inception in 1971. In 1998, Congress intended
to expand the available relief to a greater number of taxpayers. However,
courts have interpreted the new remedies narrowly. By expanding the
scope of the actual knowledge exception, courts have barred many
taxpayers from obtaining separation of liability relief. Congress should
clarify its intent by amending the actual knowledge exception to give
separation of liability its intended reach. Alternatively, the Treasury
should amend its Regulations to bring them in line with the legislative
intent, as evidenced by § 6015(c)'s history, structure, and text. The
bonds of joint tax liability should not be stronger than marriage.
282. Cf. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253; S. REP. No. 105-174, at 59 (1998) (stating that the
Service is required to prove that "the electing spouse had actual knowledge that an item on a return
is incorrect").
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